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1Physical Layer Security in Cooperative Energy
Harvesting Networks with a Friendly Jammer
Tiep M. Hoang, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, Nguyen-Son Vo, and Chinmoy Kundu
Abstract—In this paper, we consider a cooperative wireless
network consisting of a source, multiple intermediate energy
harvesting nodes and a destination, in the presence of a pas-
sive eavesdropper. First, the intermediate nodes use the time
switching-based relaying protocol to harvest energy from the
source signal. Then, a pair out of intermediate nodes are
selected as a relay and a jammer to transmit confidential and
jamming signals to the destination and eavesdropper. Under these
assumptions, we evaluate the system performance in terms of
secrecy outage probability.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, energy harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) and energy harvesting (EH)
have been attracting a great deal of attention from the re-
searcher community. While the objective of PLS is to guaran-
tee and enhance confidential messages [1]–[4], that of EH is
to utilize the harvested energy of wireless received signals for
information processing [5]. Although each topic has been well
investigated as an individual body of knowledge in literature,
it is only recently that their combination has been emerged as
an attractive research approach [1]–[4].
In [1], the authors considered a secure network using a
multiple-antenna relay which is capable of harvesting energy.
In [2], a friendly jammer with the ability of harvesting energy
was used to resist eavesdropping. Meanwhile, the authors in
[3] designed artificial noise for both interfering with undesired
destinations and being cancelable at the intended receiver.
Besides, energy harvesting was also discussed in relation to
the security of each individual subcarrier in an orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing access network as in [4].
Motivated by these work, in this paper, we study the secure
performance of a cooperative relaying network which consists
of energy harvesting nodes. Different from [1]–[3] which
used only one intermediate node, we utilize two intermediate
nodes (i.e., a relay and a jammer) for improving the gain
of desired channel gain and simultaneously interfering with
the eavesdropping channel. In [2] and [4], the authors did
not consider the relaying protocol using time switching-based
relaying (TSR) technique (presented in [5]). Moreover, the
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Fig. 1. The system model of interest.
simultaneous use of both relay and jammer was not taken into
account in these works. To the best of authors’ knowledge, the
role of such TSR circuitries in both-relay-and-jammer-aided
networks is not conducted by any previous work. Note that,
although the impact of light-of-sight (LOS) on the harvested
energy loss in the context of energy harvesting has recently
emerged as one important topic [6], it is not considered in
this paper. With many individual aspects of both security
and energy harvesting, we choose not to investigate the LOS
factor. Instead, we aim to highlight the secure performance
when considering intermediate nodes equipped with energy
harvesting circuitries. Furthermore, we examine the following
two schemes: i) the best relay is chosen for forwarding the
retransmitted signal while the jammer is random; ii) the best
jammer is chosen for interfering with the eavesdropper while
the relay is random. Based on the two schemes of interest,
we evaluate the secure performance through the security
outage probability (SOP). We demonstrate that the system
performance deteriorates in terms of security if the amount
of time used for energy harvesting is much larger than that
used for information processing and vice versa.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a cooperative wireless network, which consists
of one source S, one destination D, one eavesdropper E, and
M + 1 intermediate nodes Ii, (i = 1, 2, ...,M + 1) using
decode-and-forward protocol. We assume that the direct link
between S and D is not available due to bad conditions
and the transmission from S to D is performed by the help
of the trusted intermediate nodes {Ii}M+1i=1 . All channels are
assumed to undergo Rayleigh fading, and the channel power
gain between X ∈ {S, Ii} and Y ∈ {Ii, D,E} \X is denoted
by hXY . Then we can say that hXY obeys the exponential
distribution with rate 1/ΩXY , i.e., hXY ∼ Exp
(
1
ΩXY
)
. For
simplicity, we set ΩSIi = ΩSIj and ΩIiE = ΩIjE with i 6= j.
Among M + 1 intermediate nodes, we choose a node as a
relay R and another node as a jammer J . The relay R will
2transmit confidential signals, while the jammer J will transmit
jamming signals. Suppose that D and J cooperate with each
other such that the jamming signal can be nulled out at D [7].
In contrast, E has to extract both the confidential information
from R and the interference from J .
In the considered network, we employ the TSR protocol
presented in [5]. Then, assuming that each Ii harvests energy
from S and uses this energy to transmit relaying and jamming
signals, we can express the transmit power of Ii as
PIi =
ηPShSIiαT
(1− α)T/2 =
2ηPShSIiα
(1− α) , (1)
where PS is the transmit power of S, η ∈ (0, 1) is the energy
conversion efficiency which depends on the rectification pro-
cess and the energy harvesting circuitry, T is the block time in
which a certain block of information is transmitted from the
source node to the destination node, α ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction
of the block time in which intermediate nodes harvest energy
from the source signal.1
A. Best relay and random jammer (bR-rJ)
In this strategy, the jammer J is first randomly selected
among {Ii}M+1i=1 . Without loss of the generality, we assume
that the (M + 1)-th intermediate node is the jammer, J =
IM+1. The relay R∗ is then selected among the M remaining
intermediate nodes such that the channel power gain of the
R∗-D link is largest, i.e.,
hR∗D , max
i=1,...,M
hIiD (2)
where hIiD is the channel power gains of the Ii-D link. Then
the instantaneous received SNR at D and E are, respectively,
given by
γbR-rJD = (PR/N0)hR∗D = ξhSR∗hR∗D, (3)
γbR-rJE =
PRhR∗E
(N0 + PJhJE)
=
ξhSR∗hR∗E
1 + ξhSJhJE
(4)
where ξ , 2ηαPS(1−α)N0 .
B. Random relay and best jammer (rR-bJ)
In this strategy, the relay R is first randomly selected among
{Ii}M+1i=1 . Without loss of the generality, we assume that
the (M + 1)-th intermediate node is the relay, R = IM+1.
The jammer J∗ is then selected among the M remaining
intermediate nodes such that the channel power gain of the
J∗-E link is largest, i.e.,
hJ∗E = max
i=1,...,M
hIiE (5)
where hIiE is the channel power gains of the Ii-E link. The
instantaneous received SNRs at D and E are, respectively,
given by
γrR-bJD = (PR/N0)hRD = ξhSRhRD, (6)
γrR-bJE =
PRhRE
N0 + PJhJ∗E
=
ξhSRhRE
1 + ξhSJ∗hJ∗E
. (7)
1Note that αT is the amount of time used for energy harvesting, while the
remaining of the block time, (1 − α)T , is for information processing.
III. EXACT SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we consider two transmission strategies at
the cooperative nodes: i) Best relay and random jammer (bR-
rJ) and ii) random relay and best jammer (rR-bJ). To compare
the effect of these two strategies on the security performance
of our system, we evaluate the SOP which is given by
Pout = P {Cs < R} = P {γD < βγE + (β − 1)} (8)
where γE ∈ {γbR-rJE , γrR-bJE }, γD ∈ {γbR-rJD , γrR-bJD }, and β =
2
2R
1−α ≥ 1 with R ≥ 0 and α ∈ (0, 1).
A. Best relay and random jammer (bR-rJ)
By substituting Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) into Eq. (8), the SOP
can be expressed as
P
bR-rJ
out = P
{
γbR-rJD < βγ
bR-rJ
E + (β − 1)
}
=
∫ ∞
0
P
{
hR∗D ≤ βhR
∗E
1 + ξhSJhJE
+
(β − 1)
ξx
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Φ1(x)
fhSR∗ (x)dx.
(9)
Let V , 1 + ξhSJhJE and a , β−1ξ , we then rewrite the
function Φ1(x) in Eq. (9) as
Φ1(x) =
∫ ∞
1
[∫ ∞
0
FhR∗D
(
βh
v
+
a
x
)
fhR∗E (h)dh
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Φ2(x,v)
fV(v)dv
(10)
where the PDF of V is derived as Eq. (A.2) in Appendix A.
The function Φ2(x, v) in Eq. (10) can be calculated as
Φ2(x, v) =
∫ ∞
0
[
1− exp
{
− 1
ΩID
(
βh
v
+
β − 1
ξx
)}]M
× (1/ΩIE) exp {−h/ΩIE} dh
= 1−
∑˜
em(1−β)/(ξxΩID)
v
v +mβ (ΩIE/ΩID)
(11)
where
∑˜
=
∑M
m=1
(
M
m
)
(−1)m−1. Substituting Eq. (11) and
Eq. (A.2) into Eq. (10), we obtain
Φ1(x) = 1−
∑˜ 2
ξΩSIΩIE
em(1−β)/(ξxΩID)
×
∫ ∞
1
v
v +mβ (ΩIE/ΩID)
K0
(
2
√
v−1
ξΩSIΩIE
)
dv
= 1−
∑˜
e
m(1−β)
ξxΩID
[
1− 4mβ
ξΩSIΩID
S−1,0
(
2φm√
ξ
)]
(12)
where φm ,
√
1+mβ(ΩIE/ΩID)
ΩSIΩIE
, S−1,0(·) is the Lommel func-
tion [8, Eq. (10.73.4)], and Kn(·) (with n = 0, 1, . . .) is the
modified Bessel function of the second kind [9]. It is noted
that the last equality is obtained with the help of [9, Eqs.
(6.561.16) and (6.565.7)].
Finally, we substitute Eq. (12) into Eq. (9) and arrive at
P
bR-rJ
out = 1−
∑˜[
1− 4mβξΩSIΩIDS−1,0
(
2φm√
ξ
)]
×
√
4m(β−1)
ξΩSIΩID
K1
(√
4m(β−1)
ξΩSIΩID
)
. (13)
3B. Random relay and best jammer
By substituting Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) into Eq. (8), the SOP
can be expressed as
P
bR-rJ
out = P
{
γrRbJD < βγ
rRbJ
E + (β − 1)
}
=
∫ ∞
0
P
{
hRD ≤ βhRE
1 + ξhSJ∗hJ∗E
+
(β − 1)
ξx
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Ψ1(x)
fhSR(x)dx.
(14)
Let U , 1 + ξhSJ∗hJ∗E , we then rewrite the function Ψ1(x)
in Eq. (14) as
Ψ1(x) =
∫ ∞
1
[∫ ∞
0
FhRD
(
βh
u
+
a
x
)
fhRE (h)dh
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ2(x,u)
fU(u)du
(15)
where the PDF of U is derived as Eq. (B.2) in Appendix B.
The function Ψ2(x, u) in Eq. (15) can be calculated as
Ψ2(x, u) =
∫ ∞
0
[
1− exp
{
− 1
ΩID
(
βh
u
+
a
x
)}]
× (1/ΩIE) exp {−h/ΩIE} dh
= 1− e(1−β)/(ξxΩID) u
u+ β (ΩIE/ΩID)
. (16)
Substituting Eq. (16) and Eq. (B.2) into Eq. (15), we obtain
Ψ1(x) = 1−
∑˜ 2m
ξΩSIΩIE
e(1−β)/(ξxΩID)
×
∫ ∞
1
u
u+ β (ΩIE/ΩID)
K0
(
2
√
m(u−1)
ξΩSIΩIE
)
du
= 1−
∑˜
e
(1−β)
ξxΩID
[
1− 4mβ
ξΩSIΩID
S−1,0
(
2θm√
ξ
)]
(17)
where θm ,
√
m(1+β(ΩIE/ΩID))
ΩSIΩIE
and the last equality is
obtained with the help of [9, Eqs. (6.561.16) and (6.565.7)].
Finally, we substitute Eq. (17) into Eq. (14) and arrive at
P
rR-bJ
out = 1−
∑˜[
1− 4mβξΩSIΩIDS−1,0
(
2θm√
ξ
)]
×
√
4(β−1)
ξΩSIΩID
K1
(√
4(β−1)
ξΩSIΩID
)
. (18)
IV. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. High SNR regime
1) Best relay and random jammer (bR-rJ): The exact
expression for the SOP in (13) relies on two special functions,
i.e., S−1,0(·) and K1(·). Therefore, using the identities [8, Eq.
(10.73.4)] for S−1,0(z) and [9, Eq. (8.446)] for K1(z), we can
obtain the approximate expressions for S−1,0(z) and zK1(z)
when z → 0 as follows:
S−1,0(z)
z→0≈ 1
2
ln2
(z
2
)
+ γ ln
(z
2
)
+
γ2
2
+
pi2
12
, Sasym(z)
(19)
and
zK1(z)
z→0≈ 1 + z
2
2
[
ln
(z
2
)
+ γ − 1
2
]
, Kasym(z) (20)
where γ is the Euler - Mascheroni constant. Sasym(z) and
Kasym(z) respectively are the approximate expressions for
S−1,0(z) and zK1(z) as z → 0. Owing to the relation
ξ = 2ηα1−α
PS
N0
, we have limPS/N0→0 P
bR-rJ
out = limξ−1→0 P
bR-rJ
out .
Applying (19) and (20) to (13), we can obtain the asymptotic
expression for the SOP at very high ξ (i.e., 1/ξ → 0) as
follows:
P
bR-rJ
asym = lim
ξ−1→0
P
bR-rJ
out
= 1−
∑˜
Kasym
(√
4m(β−1)
ξΩSIΩID
)[
1− 4mβξΩSIΩIDSasym
(
2φm√
ξ
)]
.
(21)
2) Random relay and best jammer (rR-bJ): Applying (19)
and (20) to (18), we can obtain the asymptotic expression for
the SOP at very high ξ (i.e., 1/ξ → 0) as follows:
P
rR-bJ
asym = lim
ξ−1→0
P
rR-bJ
out
= 1−Kasym
(√
4(β−1)
ξΩSIΩID
)∑˜[
1− 4mβξΩSIΩIDSasym
(
2θm√
ξ
)]
.
(22)
Remark 1: If M = 1, the exact expressions Eq. (13) and
Eq. (18) for the SOP are exactly the same. This also applies to
the asymptotic expressions Eq. (21) and Eq. (22) when M = 1.
B. Special cases of α
1) α → 0+: In this case, we have ξ → 0 and β → 22R.
From (3)-(4) and (6)-(7), the instantaneous SNRs γD and γE
approach 0. As a result, Pout in (8) is approximated as
lim
α→0
Pout = P
{
0 < 22R × 0 + (β − 1)} = 1. (23)
2) α → 1−: In this case, we rewrite γD = c11−α with
c1 ∈ { 2ηPSN0 hSR∗hR∗D,
2ηPS
N0
hSRhRD} from (3)-(4), and have
γE → c2 with c2 ∈
{
hSR∗hR∗E
hSJhJE
, hSRhREhSJ∗hJ∗E
}
from (6)-(7).
Then Pout in (8) becomes
lim
α→1−
Pout = lim
t,(1−α)−1
t→+∞
P
{
c1 <
22Rt
t
c2 − 1
t
}
= 1. (24)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the SOP and verify the analysis
through the simulation. Common parameters for both Figs. 2
and 3 are as follows: M = {1, 10}, η = 0.85, R = 0.25
(bits/s/Hz), ΩSI = 2.5, ΩID = 1.5 and ΩIE = 2. In Fig. 2, we
show the SOP as a function of PS/N0 with α = 0.5. In Fig.
3 and 4, we fix PS/N0 = 15 dB, then respectively showing
the SOP versus α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1). Based on numerical
results, we observe that when M increases, the bR-rJ scheme
is more efficient than the rR-bJ scheme in terms of security.
Moreover, the secure performance can be further improved
when M increases.
Finally, Fig. 2 verifies the agreement between the exact
analysis and simulation, while the asymptotic analysis is very
close to the exact analysis at high PS/N0. Besides, Fig. 3
shows that setting α→ 0+ or α→ 1− is not beneficial to the
secure performance. In Fig. 4, the security level of the system
increases with η given that the harvested energy also benefits
from this parameter.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability with M = {1, 10}, η = 0.85, α = 0.5,
R = 0.25 (bits/s/Hz), ΩSI = 2.5, ΩID = 1.5 and ΩIE = 2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has derived exact and asymptotic expressions
for the SOP in a cooperative secure network utilizing energy
harvesting. Based on analytical and simulation results, we
confirm that the security of the proposed system can be further
enhanced with increasing number of intermediate nodes and
increasing the SNR. More importantly, we show that in the
TSR protocol [5], the secure performance deteriorates sig-
nificantly in two cases: α → 0+ and α → 1−. In contrast,
the more η becomes, the more secure and harvested energy
performance the system gains.
APPENDIX
A. The distribution of V , 1 + ξhSJhJE
The CDF of V can be derived as
FV (v) = 1− 2
√
v−1
ξΩSIΩIE
K1
(
2
√
v − 1
ξΩSIΩIE
)
if v ≥ 1, (A.1)
and its PDF is consequently calculated as
fV(v) =
2
ξΩSIΩIE
K0
(
2
√
v − 1
ξΩSIΩIE
)
if v ≥ 1. (A.2)
B. The distribution of U , 1 + ξhSJ∗hJ∗E
The CDF of U can be derived as
FU (u) = 1− 2
∑˜√
(u−1)m
ξΩIEΩSI
K1
(
2
√
(u−1)m
ξΩIEΩSI
)
if u ≥ 1,
(B.1)
and its PDF is consequently calculated as
fU(u) =
∑˜
2m
ξΩSIΩIE
K0
(
2
√
(u−1)m
ξΩSIΩIE
)
if u ≥ 1. (B.2)
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability with M = {1, 10}, η = 0.85, R = 0.25
(bits/s/Hz), PS/N0 = 15 dB, ΩSI = 2.5, ΩID = 1.5 and ΩIE = 2.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability with M = {1, 10}, α = 0.5, R = 0.25
(bits/s/Hz), PS/N0 = 15 dB, ΩSI = 2.5, ΩID = 1.5 and ΩIE = 2.
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